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United States Information Agency

Washington, D.C. 20547

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September 4, 1987

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Louis Schwartz

Deputy Assistant Secretary Diplomatic Security Service

Department of State

FROM

Bernard C. Dowling Nov

Director

Office of Security

SUBJECT

Non-Fraternization/Contact Reporting Policy-

Revised Draft

REFERENCE

Letter, Chairman OSPG, subject as above,

dated August 19, 1987.

In response to referenced letter, the following recommendations are submitted concerning subject document:

"This document sets forth the guidelines for the conduct of personal relationships with foreign nationals and the contact reporting responsibilities which must be adhered to by all personnel in each foreign service agency of the U.S. Government. It must be recognized that although the atmosphere in eastern Europe appears to be evolving towards a lessened threat, in fact, the danger posed by Hostile Intelligence Services (HIS) is as great, if not greater than that in the past. These Services may play upon the misperceptions of USG employees that as openness increases, the need to remain alert to approaches by HIS proportionately decreases. The wording of this document is therefore intentionally strong to emphasize the importance of the fraternization and contact reporting policies to the security of the United States as well as the personal protection of the individual."

"The wording should additionally not be misconstrued to imply that the reader will be automatically subject to disciplinary action should he/she report a questionable contact or relationship. Although, as stated in the policy, a willful failure to comply will be treated with

utmost seriousness, any questions should be immediately brought to the attention of the security office of the appropriate agency. That office will provide all possible assistance in protecting the USG employee by early identification of HIS personnel or organizations and by precluding involvement of the employee in possibly compromising situations."

b. Insert the following into the present second paragraph, Section I:

"Business and social relationships . . . and the Department. It is recognized that certain elements of a mission must have extensive contacts with the local citizenry in order to perform their assigned functions. Proper consideration will be given to these requirements."

- c. Insert the following into the first paragraph, Section II:

  "This instruction . . . and their dependents. Foreign
  Service National employees assigned to the missions not included in Appendices I and II will be subject to similar requirements to be developed and disseminated locally."
- d. Paragraph five, Section III, should be changed to read: "The department . . . about reporting possible violations."
- e. Paragraph C5, Section IV, should be changed to read:
  "RSO's will . . . Counterintelligence staff (DS/CI). A
  copy of each report from non-DOS employees will be provided
  directly to the parent agency security office. CI
  investigations or other activities concerning non DOS
  personnel will only be initiated after consultation with
  the parent agency."
- f. Change paragraph one, Section V to read:

"Chiefs of Mission . . . and to DS/CI. As such instructions impact on all personnel at post, changes will be coordinated at the Headquarters level with other concerned agencies."

This office believes that adoption of the recommendations cited above will insure promulgation of a cohesive fraternization/contact reporting policy and at the same time permit each individual foreign affairs agency to accomplish it's assigned mission. Additionally, the recommended explanation of why such a stringent policy continues to be necessary will enhance the policy's effectiveness by promoting an understanding of it.

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A copy of this memorandum is being provided to each OSPG member.

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## DISTRIBUTION:

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